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Abstract 
    We use a New Keynesian model with imperfectly competitive goods markets and income 
inequality and study their impact on fiscal multipliers, output and welfare. Results show that 
imperfect competition has a positive effect on the government spending multiplier and a 
negative effect on tax multipliers. In addition, imperfect competition positively affects the 
balanced budget multiplier. Inequality positively affects the government spending multiplier 
but negatively affects the tax and balanced budget multipliers when poor workers are taxed, 
while the opposite is true when wealthy workers are taxed. Looking at the welfare effects of 
imperfect competition, we find that it positively affects the net welfare gains of both income 
groups as well as social welfare. In addition, greater numbers of poor workers reduce net 
welfare gains and social welfare when they are the ones taxed while the opposite is true when 
wealthy workers are taxed. Changes in workers’ MPCs have an ambiguous effect on net 
welfare gains and social welfare when poor workers are taxed but a positive effect when 
wealthy workers are taxed. Therefore, our model proves that under imperfect competition and 
income inequality the maximum net increase in expenditure, output and social welfare comes 
when the government increases government spending and taxes wealthy workers. 
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1. Introduction 
    Macroeconomic theory, and specifically Keynesian economics, has long supported the idea 
that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is crucial for evaluating fiscal policy 
effectiveness, an idea first formulated by Keynes (1936) which is still included in standard 
macroeconomic textbooks (Blanchard and Johnson 2012; Mankiw 2014). The MPC of an 
individual is affected by his wealth and income with poorer people consuming a greater 
percentage of their income and vice versa. As a result, differences in wealth and income 
distribution, in other words income inequality, lead to significant variations in the MPC of 
different individuals and different sectors of society in an economy. All of the above imply 
that income inequality and the MPC have a significant impact on fiscal policy shocks. 
    However, for a number of years, authors did not incorporate income inequality and 
different MPCs in their analysis. Simple new Keynesian models (Hart, (1982); Dixon, (1987); 
Mankiw, (1987); Molana and Moutos, (1992); Torregrosa, (2003); Bénassy, (2001; 2005)) 
and even complex DSGE models (Bouakez and Rebei, (2007); Ercolani, (2007); Forni et al, 
(2010)) either assume that we have representative agents with no income and MPC 
differences, or do not use income inequality and the MPC in their analysis. Meanwhile, a 
number of researchers (Hazel and Thorat, (1998); Fiszbein and Schady, (2009); Evans and 
Popova, (2014)) studying the effects of redistributive spending under income inequality 
conclude that public spending can increase expenditure and output, while improving earning 
opportunities for the poor. These papers, although providing interesting insights about the role 
of government spending in the presence of income inequality, do not study the effects of 
income inequality on fiscal policy, expenditure, output and welfare nor do they provide a 
theoretical background to explain how income inequality and the MPC affect fiscal policy.  
    Recently, authors have developed models, where individual heterogeneity plays an 
important part in determining macroeconomic variables and policy outcomes. These models, 
known as HANK (Heterogeneous Agents New Keynesian Models) have proven that income 
inequality and MPC differences affect economic policy. Carroll et al (2014; 2016), Japelli and 
Pistaferri (2014), and Anderson et al (2016) empirically confirm the negative relationship 
between income and the MPC and the considerable MPC variation between different income 
groups because of income inequality. These papers conclude that higher government spending 
targeted to the bottom income deciles and financed by taxing wealthier people can boost 
consumption much more than when the MPC is assumed to be the same for all households. 
Gornemann et al (2015) and Auclert (2017) evaluate the redistributive effects of monetary 
policy and conclude that income heterogeneity amplifies monetary policy shocks when 
households have different MPCs. Dosi et al (2010; 2013) analyze the effects of economic 
policy under different conditions characterizing the distribution of income between profits 
and wages. Their results indicate that when the profit mark-up is greater, higher doses of 
fiscal policy are needed to secure full employment and promote growth. Auclert and Rognlie 
(2018) examine how changes in income inequality, which result from idiosyncratic changes in 
labour demand, affect macroeconomic activity and conclude that permanent increases in 
income inequality, lead to recessions, which can be undone by fiscal policy.       
    In this paper, we re-examine the effect of income inequality and imperfect competition in 
the goods market on fiscal policy, output and welfare. The difference in our model is that 
income inequality is a result of wage differences rather than differences in the  distribution of 
income between profit and wages (Dosi et al, (2010; 2013)), because as Piketty (2014; 2016) 
points out increasing wage differences are one of the main reasons for income inequality in 
many countries today. In addition, fiscal multipliers are not affected only by the income 
shares of profits and wages (Dosi et al, (2010; 2013)) or by labor demand shortages that lower 
wages alone (Auclert and Rognlie, (2018)); instead, it is both income inequality and firms’ 
market power that affect the multiplier. In addition, profits in our model affect income and 
consumption, unlike Dosi et al (2010; 2013), where household income is composed entirely 
of wages. Furthermore, our paper investigates how income inequality and firms’ market 
power can amplify tax policies and the net effect of fiscal policies by studying the tax and 
balanced budget multipliers, something not studied in the aforementioned literature. Our 
paper also examines the welfare effects of fiscal policies and how fiscal policies can be Pareto 
improving, by using the methodology of Adam (2004) for calculating the net welfare effects 
of economic policies and a social welfare function (Acemoglu and Robinson (2005)); to the 
best of our knowledge no other author has used these methods in similar papers.  
    We conduct our analysis using a New Keynesian macroeconomic model of an economy 
with imperfect competition in the goods market (Hart, (1982); Dixon, (1987); Mankiw, 
(1987); Molana and Moutos, (1992); Torregrosa, (2003); Bénassy, (2001; 2005)) but we 
expand it by adding skill heterogeneity (Auclert and Rognlie (2018)), resulting in income 
inequality and different MPCs. We then examine how income inequality and imperfect 
competition influence fiscal policy, output and welfare. 
    Results show that greater imperfect competition in the goods market increases the size of 
the government spending multiplier and the size of the balanced budget multiplier. As a 
result, an increase in government spending leads to a greater consumption and profits rise and 
in a greater increase in output (Hart, (1982); Dixon, (1987); Mankiw, (1987); Bénassy, (2001; 
2005); Dosi et al, (2010; 2013)). Furthermore, imperfect competition negatively affects tax 
multipliers because as firms’ market power increases taxes lead to a greater reduction of 
consumption, profits and output (Hart, (1982); Dixon, (1987); Mankiw, (1987); Bénassy, 
(2001; 2005)). Looking at the effect of inequality, we see that it positively affects the 
government spending multiplier by amplifying its positive effects on consumption (Carroll et 
al, (2014; 2016); Japelli and Pistaferri, (2014); Anderson et al, (2016)) and output 
(Gornemann et al, (2015); Auclert, (2017); Auclert and Rognlie, (2018)). In addition, higher 
inequality in the form of an increase in the number of poor workers or an increase in workers’ 
MPC negatively affects the tax multiplier and the balanced budget multiplier when poor 
workers finance fiscal policy; when instead wealthy workers are taxed, inequality positively 
affects the tax and balanced budget multipliers. Therefore, our model indicates that under 
imperfect competition and inequality, the maximum net increase in expenditure and output 
comes when increased government spending is financed by taxing wealthier people. These 
findings are in line with Hazel and Thorat (1998), Fiszbein and Schady (2009) and Evans and 
Popova (2014) who show that government spending and progressive taxes increase 
consumption, profits and output and lead to a more efficient resource allocation. Carroll et al 
(2014; 2016), Japelli and Pistaferri (2014); Anderson et al (2016) also prove that inequality 
positively affects fiscal policy and consumption, when financed by wealthier taxpayers while 
Gornemann et al (2015), Auclert (2017) and Auclert and Ronglie (2018) find that inequality 
amplifies the positive effects of economic policy. Examining the effect of inequality on 
welfare, we find that greater imperfect competition increases social welfare and the net 
welfare gains of both income groups regardless of tax policies. In addition, higher numbers of 
poor workers negatively affect net welfare gains and social welfare when poor workers are 
taxed. If instead wealthy workers are taxed, net welfare gains of poor workers and social 
welfare are positively affected, while the opposite is true for the net welfare gains of wealthy 
workers. Changes in workers’ MPCs have an ambiguous effect on net welfare gains and 
social welfare when poor workers are taxed but a positive effect when wealthy workers are 
taxed. Finally, the maximum increase in social welfare always comes when wealthy workers 
finance government spending as in Thorat (1998), Fiszbein and Schady (2009) and Evans and 
Popova (2014). 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide the model of our 
economy. Section 3 has an analysis of public spending schemes financed by taxing poor or 
wealthy workers and Section 4 analyses the welfare effects of fiscal policy. Section 5 
provides an empirical assessment of our model and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The economy 
    The model we use is based on a simple new Keynesian model of imperfect competition 
(Hart (1982); Dixon (1987); Mankiw (1987); Molana and Moutos (1992); 
Bénassy(2001;2005); Torregrosa (2003)) but we enrich it with skill heterogeneity (Auclert 
and Rognlie (2018)), resulting in income inequality. We construct the simplest economic 
model possible in order to illustrate the main idea we want to present in this paper. Since our 
main objective is to examine how imperfect competition and income inequality affects fiscal 
policy, output and welfare, we refrain from using more complex general equilibrium models, 
which could alter but not invalidate our argument. 
 
2.1 People 
    The economy is populated by a continuum of people indexed by )1;0( . A number λ of 
these people have no skill endowment and are poor workers, while the remaining )(   
people have high skill endowment due to education or work experience and are wealthy 
workers. We use income/wage rather than wealth differences because it is one of the main 
reasons for increasing inequality in most countries over the last 30 years (Piketty, (2014; 
2016)). The majority of the economy’s population consists of poor workers, so )(   .  
    The time available to all people equals T and is divided between working hours    and 
leisure  L . However, as we mentioned wealthy workers are skilled and educated; for this 
reason, their labour productivity is bigger as in Auclert and Rognlie (2018). Therefore, the 
effective labour supply of a wealthy worker is )( i  where 0i  is the higher 
productivity of wealthy workers. The labour supply of poor workers equals  . Wages are 
equal to the amount of labour supplied by each individual so poor workers have a wage equal 
to   and wealthy workers have a wage equal to )( i .    
    People choose between two goods, consumption and leisure. Each individual maximizes a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function where he chooses between consumption ( iC ) and leisure ( iL ): 
11111 log)1(log LaCaU  ,    11 a      (1) 
22222 log)1(log LaCaU  ,    12 a      (2) 
   Where 1  and 2 , are the MPC of each worker type. As we have seen in Carroll et al 
(2014; 2016), Japelli and Pistaferri (2014), and Anderson et al (2016), people with higher 
incomes use a smaller percentage of their income for consumption compared to those who 
have smaller incomes but use a greater percentage of their income for consumption; in other 
words, their MPC is smaller. For this reason, we assume that 21    which shows that poor 
workers use a greater percentage of their income for consumption, compared to wealthy 
workers who have bigger incomes but consume a smaller percentage of their income. 
    People own the economy’s firms, receive all profits    and pay a lump-sum tax  iV . 
Each individual’s budget constraint is therefore: 
ii VLTPCi 
 )(  , 
ii VTLPCi 
    (3) 
    As mentioned before, 1  and 2 , denote the share of income workers use for consumption. 
Using these indexes, we find the consumption function of every type of individual. 
)( 111 VTPC 
     (4) 
])[( 222 VTPC i 
     (5) 
    Equations (4) and (5) are the consumption functions for each one of the two types of people 
in the economy and 21 ,  denote their MPCs. Note that in equation (5) the wage income of 
wealthy workers is higher by i . However, their lower MPC mitigates the effect of greater 
incomes on consumption.     
 
2.2 Firms 
  The goods market is characterized by imperfect competition (Hart, (1982); Dixon, (1987); 
Mankiw, (1987); Molana and Moutos, (1992); Bénassy,(2001; 2005); Torregrosa, (2003); 
Dosi et al, (2010; 2013)). More specifically, we have a number of  firms in the economy, 
and each firm produces quantity q  of a single good using labour as their only input. The 
demand function for the whole industry equals: 
P
YQ     (6) 
Where Q  is total output of the industry,   the price level and   is the economy’s 
expenditure. 
    The cost function of each firm is: 
cqFqTC )(    (7) 
    Where 
Qq  is the output per firm. We assume, as in Hart (1982), Dixon (1987), 
Mankiw (1987), Molana and Moutos (1992), Torregrosa (2003), Bénassy (2001;2005) and 
Dosi et al (2010; 2013) that firms operate under imperfect competition and have market 
power. We calculate market power by using the Lerner Index (Lerner, (1934)) 
P
MCP     (8), 
where   is the Lerner index, MC  the marginal cost and P  the price level. 
    Combining equations (6) and (8) and by differentiating equation (7) we get the following 
equation describing the demand function of the industry: 
YcQ
)1(     (9) 
We then calculate total profits for the whole industry which equal revenue minus the costs: 
cQMFPQ    (10) 
Using equations (6) and (9) and assuming for simplicity that fixed costs are equal to zero we 
express profits in terms of expenditure and the profit mark-up that firms have: 
Y   (11) 
Equation (11) shows that profits in the economy depend on expenditure. 
 
2.3 Government 
    Government collects lump-sum taxes, in order to buy goods produced by the firms, which 
it uses as input to produce the public good using a simple production function: )(qfG  . 
These goods cover all types of government ouput (healthcare, education, social 
security, infrastructure, production of goods such as energy, fuel, manufacturing and 
consumption goods by state owned firms and general services such as management 
and administration) which we group in an encompassing public good. The government 
budget constraint requires that spending equals revenue: 
  GVV  21    (12) 
 
2.4 Total expenditure and output 
    Total output in the economy is equal to the sum of expenditure of the private sector i.e. 
poor workers and wealthy workers and government expenditure: 
  GPCPCY  21    (13) 
Using equations (4) and (5) and the population percentages to substitute in equation (13) we 
find: 
GVTaVTaY i 
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 ])[()()( 2211    (14) 
Using equation (11) and rearranging terms we find an expression that also makes use of the 
Lerner index: 
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    Equation (15) shows that in our model output is affected by taxation (Vi), government 
spending (G) and imperfect competition in the goods market, which is represented by the 
Lerner index (  ), just like in other New-Keynesian models of imperfect competition (Hart, 
(1982); Dixon, (1987); Mankiw, (1987); Molana and Moutos, (1992); Bénassy, (2001;2005);  
Torregrosa, (2003); Dosi et al, (2010; 2013)). Private consumption also plays a role through 
the different MPCs ( ia ) which are, as we noted before, a result of income differences (Carroll 
et al, (2014; 2016); Japelli and Pistaferri, (2014); Anderson et al, (2016)). However, when we 
allow for the existence of heterogeneous agents, we see that consumption and output is not 
affected by the MPC alone, but rather by income inequality( 1  and 2)(  ), which is 
the product of income distribution and the MPC.  
 
3. Fiscal policy using different tax financing sources 
    In this section, we examine the impact of income inequality and imperfect competition on 
fiscal policy, and specifically on the size of fiscal multipliers. In addition, using the balanced 
budget multiplier we examine the effect of imperfect competition and income inequality on 
the net economic effect of fiscal policies.  
    First, consider an increase in government spending, financed by lump-sum taxes: 
1])([1
1
21
  aadG
dY   (16) 
    This result is similar to the government spending multiplier seen in most textbooks 
(Blanchard and Johnson, (2012); Mankiw, (2014)). As expected, higher government spending 
increases expenditure and output, and greater imperfect competition positively affects this 
result. The intuition behind the result is simple: Increases in government spending raise 
consumption and profits, which in turn raise expenditure and output in the economy even 
further in the way the textbook Keynesian public spending multiplier works. In the limiting 
case where the goods market is perfectly competitive  0 , this process ends after the 
initial increase in government spending and the multiplier is unity 

 1dG
dY . Therefore, 
imperfect competition in the goods market is crucial in our analysis because it increases the 
size of the government spending multiplier, making it greater than unity 

  0,1 dG
dY . 
Consequently, as firms’ market power becomes greater, an increase in government spending 
is more productive, leading to a greater increase in consumption and profits, and resulting in a 
much greater increase in expenditure and output as in Hart (1982), Dixon (1987), Mankiw 
(1987) and Bénassy (2001; 2005) who find a positive relationship between imperfect 
competition and government spending with government spending multipliers that are greater 
than unity. Dosi et al (2010; 2013) also finds that larger income shares for profits make 
government spending more effective. However, as we can see in our model, even when firms 
have no market power  0  and profits are essentially zero, government spending can still 
be effective, although the multiplier will be equal to unity 

 1dG
dY  unlike Dosi et al (2010; 
2013) where profit mark-up is necessary for government spending to be effective. 
    In order to examine how income inequality affects government spending multipliers, we 
differentiate equation (17) with respect to either  , 1  or 2 : 
 
  0])([1 221
21 






 aad
dG
dYd
    (17)     
  0])([1 2211 





 aad
dG
dYd
    (18) 
 
  0])([1 2212 






 aad
dG
dYd
   (19) 
    Equation (17) gives us the effect of an increase in the number of poor workers and 
equations (18) and (19) give us the result of a rise in the MPC of poor workers and wealthy 
workers respectively. The result of equation (17) is easy to explain:  When   increases, the 
number of poor workers who have lower incomes but a higher MPC of 1  increases and the 
number of wealthy workers who have higher incomes but a smaller MPC of 2  decrease. The 
aggregate consumption of poor workers is greater than the aggregate consumption of wealthy 
workers because they individually consume more than wealthy workers (since 21   ) and 
because they constitute a larger segment of the population (since )(   ). Consequently, 
the more unequal an economy, the bigger ))(( 21   becomes, making the 
denominator of equation (17) smaller and the government spending multiplier bigger. As a 
result higher government spending increases expenditure and output much more in unequal 
economies, where the majority of the population consists of low-skill, low-income workers 
when compared to economies that are more egalitarian. The intuition is similar in equation 
(18). Poor workers have a high MPC so they are likely to spend nearly every penny they have 
on consumption; therefore, when their MPC increases the consumption of each poor worker 
as well as their aggregate consumption increases leading to the same result as in equation 
(17). The negative result in equation (19) is puzzling at first; it can however be explained by 
the fact that individuals of above average wealth have an MPC which is close to zero, and 
essentially static – in the short term at least – as seen in the relevant literature ((Carroll et al, 
(2014; 2016); Japelli and Pistaferri, (2014); Anderson et al, (2016)). As a result, when their 
income decreases, their MPC rises but this increase is very small meaning that wealthy 
workers actually reduce their consumption – in absolute terms - when their incomes fall.    
    The important finding of this analysis is that income inequality positively affects 
government spending multipliers. As in ordinary Keynesian models, the MPC has a positive 
effect on the size of the multiplier, but in the case of heterogeneous agents, it is the product of 
the number of people belonging to each income group and their MPCs – in other words 
income inequality – that affects fiscal multipliers. As a result the bigger income inequality is, 
the bigger the multiplier of government spending becomes; meaning that increases in 
government spending lead to a greater increase in expenditure and output the bigger income 
inequality is. These results are in line with Carroll et al (2014; 2016), Japelli and Pistaferri 
(2014), Anderson et al (2016) and Auclert and Rognlie (2018) about the role of the MPC and 
income inequality on fiscal policy. Furthermore, Hazel and Thorat (1998), Fiszbein and 
Schady (2009) and Evans and Popova (2014) also prove that government spending which 
takes into account inequality increases productivity and output, reduces poverty and allocates 
resources more efficiently. Finally, our results are similar to those of Gornemann et al (2015) 
and Auclert (2017) who find that income heterogeneity amplifies monetary policy shocks 
when households have different MPCs. We present our findings in the following proposition: 
 
Proposisiton 1: An increase in income inequality, in the form of an increase in the number of 
poor workers or an increase of their MPC positively affects government spending multipliers. 
An increase in the MPC of wealthy workers, which implies a decrease in inequality, 
negatively affects government spending multipliers.  
     
   Based on this proposition, in highly unequal economies where   21   , the 
aggregate consumption of poor workers is much bigger than that of wealthy workers, because 
they individually consume more than wealthy workers do and because they constitute a much 
larger segment of the population. Consequently, increases in government spending increase 
expenditure and output much more in unequal economies, where the majority of the 
population consists of poor workers. This result is possible because income inequality makes 
government spending more productive, leading to greater profitability and a greater increase 
in consumption, resulting in a much greater increase in expenditure and output. 
    Next, we calculate tax multipliers when poor workers and wealthy workers are taxed 
respectively: 
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    Equations (20) and (21) are similar to tax multipliers in most macroeconomics textbooks 
(Blanchard and Johnson, (2012); Mankiw, (2014)). Increased taxation, lowers expenditure 
and output and this effect becomes greater the more market power firms have. Again, the 
multiplier works through the channel of profits (Hart, (1982); Dixon, (1987); Mankiw, 
(1987)): Tax hikes lower consumption and profits, which reduces expenditure and output.         
    We then differentiate equations (20) and (21) with respect to , 1  and 2 , first for the 
case of taxes paid by poor workers and then for the case of taxes paid by wealthy workers: 
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    Equations (22) to (24) show us the effect of an increase in the number of poor workers and 
of the MPCs on the tax multipliers, when poor workers are taxed and equations (25) to (27) 
give us the same results when wealthy workers are taxed. As we can see, greater numbers of 
poor workers and higher MPCs for both worker types increase the negative effect of taxation 
on expenditure and output. The only exception is equation (25) where we examine the effect 
of an increase in the number of poor workers on tax multipliers when wealthy workers are 
taxed, but this result can be easily explained: When wealthy workers become fewer, the 
negative effect that taxing these workers has on expenditure and output becomes smaller.  
    Our results prove that income inequality has a negative impact on tax multipliers by 
making the adverse effect of taxation bigger, leading to a greater reduction in consumption, 
greater profits loss and in a much greater reduction in output. On the other hand, inequality, in 
the form of an increase in the number of poor workers, has a positive effect on tax multipliers 
when wealthy workers are taxed as the adverse effects of taxes on consumption, profits, 
expenditure and output decrease along with the number of wealthy workers. These results are 
similar to Carroll et al (2014; 2016), Japelli and Pistaferri (2014), Anderson et al (2016), as 
well as Hazel and Thorat (1998), Fiszbein and Schady (2009) and Evans and Popova (2014) 
who find that progressive taxation has smaller negative effects on resource allocation, 
expenditure and output. Based on our results, we form the following proposition:    
 
Proposition 2: In an economy with income inequality, increases in the MPC of each worker 
type increase (in absolute terms) the tax multipliers regardless of the type of worker that pays 
the increased taxes. In addition, increases in the number of poor workers increase (in 
absolute terms) the size of the tax multiplier when poor workers pay the increased taxes, but 
decrease (in absolute terms) the size of the tax multiplier when wealthy workers pay the 
increased taxes.     
     
    As we have seen in Proposition 1, in unequal economies where   21   , the 
aggregate consumption of poor workers is bigger compared to the consumption of wealthy 
workers, because they individually consume more than wealthier people do (since 21   ) 
and because they are a much larger segment of the population (since    ). 
Consequently, tax hikes lower expenditure and output more in unequal economies, where 
most of the population consists of poor workers, compared to more egalitarian economies. 
    Finally, we calculate the balanced budget multiplier, when poor workers and wealthy 
workers respectively finance the increase in government spending by subtracting equation 
(20) from equation (16) and equation (21) from equation (16): 
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  Equations (28) and (29) give us the balanced budget multiplier for each tax type. As we can 
see, when imperfect competition rises, an increase in government spending becomes more 
productive, leading to a greater increase in consumption and profits, which results in a much 
greater net increase of expenditure and output. These findings verify that imperfect 
competition in the goods market increases the size of the balanced budget multiplier (Hart, 
(1982); Dixon, (1987); Mankiw, (1987); Bénassy, (2001; 2005)). As in the case of the 
government spending multiplier our results are similar to Dosi et al (2010; 2013) where larger 
income shares for profits (i.e. greater firms’ market power) makes government spending more 
effective. However, as in the case of the government spending multiplier, when firms have no 
market power  0 , government spending is still effective, unlike Dosi et al (2010; 2013) 
where profit mark-up is necessary for government spending to be effective. 
    When it comes to income inequality, we find that that since 21 )(   , the 
maximum net increase in expenditure and output comes when the government increases 
government spending and taxes wealthy workers, as the positive effects of government 
spending on expenditure and output will be much greater compared to the case where poor 
workers are taxed 


 
 12 VGVG dG
dY
dG
dY . The logic behind this idea is the one analyzed 
before: In an economy where the majority of the population consists of poor workers, taxing 
these workers has a greater adverse effect due to that group’s greater MPC and because they 
are a bigger part of the population. Therefore, economies achieve the maximum net increase 
in expenditure and output by raising government spending and taxing wealthy workers, who 
have a smaller MPC and constitute a smaller part of the population. These results are in line 
with Carroll et al (2014; 2016), Japelli and Pistaferri (2014) and Anderson et al (2016) who 
find that government spending is more effective when financed by wealthy households. 
Similarly, Hazel and Thorat (1998), Fiszbein and Schady (2009) and Evans and Popova 
(2014) prove that higher government spending financed by progressive taxes is more 
productive, resulting in a greater profits and consumption rise, and in a more efficient 
resource allocation. Similarly, Gornemann et al (2015), Auclert (2017) and Auclert and 
Ronglie (2018) posit that inequality positively affects expansionary economic policy.   
    We then calculate how the number of poor workers and the MPC affect the balanced 
budget multiplier: 
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The results of Equations (28) to (35) lead to a number of results, which we formally present in 
the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: In an economy with income inequality and imperfect competition in the goods 
market, the following statements are true: 
 Imperfect competition has a positive effect on the size of the balanced budget 
multiplier; as a result when this variable becomes greater, increased government 
spending becomes more productive, leading to a greater consumption and profits 
rise, and resulting in a much greater net increase in expenditure and output.  
 The maximum net increase in expenditure and output comes when the government 
increases government spending and taxes the minority of wealthy workers. 
 A rise in the number of poor workers reduces the net increase in expenditure and 
output that increased government spending causes when the government taxes poor 
workers but positively affects the net increase in expenditure and output that 
increased government spending causes when the government taxes wealthy workers.   
 A rise in the wealthy workers’ MPC  positively affects the net increase of expenditure 
and output caused by increased government spending regardless of which income 
group finances this spending.  
 A rise in poor workers’ MPC positively affects the net increase of expenditure and 
output caused by increased government spending when wealthy worker finance this 
spending but negatively affects it when poor workers finance it. 
    
    To sum up, our model shows that imperfect competition has a positive effect on 
government spending multipliers, making them greater than unity 

  0,1 dG
dY , a 
negative effect on tax multipliers 
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idV
dY  and a positive effect on the balanced 
budget multiplier 
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iVGdG
dY  because greater imperfect competition 
increases the size of fiscal multipliers. As a result, higher government spending 
(taxation) leads to a greater rise (reduction) in profits and consumption, resulting in a 
greater increase (decrease) in output. Income inequality also has a positive effect on 
government spending and a negative effect on tax multipliers. Furthermore, the balanced 
budget multiplier is positive regardless of which income group is taxed and the maximum net 
increase in expenditure and output comes when increased government spending is financed 
by taxing wealthy workers 


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4.   Welfare analysis  
    In the previous section, we have seen that income inequality and imperfect competition in 
the goods market positively affect the size of fiscal multipliers and the net increase of 
expenditure and output in the economy. However, we also need to examine if a government’s 
fiscal policy can improve the welfare of the people in the economy. For this reason, we 
examine the welfare gains or losses of fiscal policy using the methodology of Adam (2004) 
and the social welfare function of Acemoglu and Robinson (2005).  
    In order to make a complete evaluation of the welfare effects of fiscal policy, we need to 
examine both the income benefits of higher government spending and the income losses of 
higher taxes. Government spending in our model does not affect utility directly. However, 
since utility increases if the budget constraint of the individual increases and since people in 
our model receive all the profits and wages, using the balanced budget multiplier will be 
sufficient for examining the welfare effects of higher government spending on utility 
(Mankiw, (1987); Torregrosa, (2003)). We then use the methodology of Adam (2004) in 
order to calculate the welfare losses caused by taxes. We first derive the indirect utility 
functions for the representative poor worker and wealthy worker respectively using equations 
(1) (2) (4) and (5): 
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    Where 2211 )(, VTwVTw i    is the total wealth of poor and 
wealthy workers respectively. Equations (36) and (37) give us the indirect utility function 
of poor workers and wealthy workers respectively. Using these results, we calculate the social 
welfare function following Acemoglu and Robinson (2005):  
21 )(     (38) 
    We then calculate the welfare losses of each income group when we impose them a lump-
sum tax: 
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    Equations (39) and (40) give us the welfare losses for poor workers and wealthy workers 
respectively when a lump-sum tax is imposed on them. 
    Having already seen in Section 3 how changes in income inequality affect the net increase 
in expenditure and output (and hence income) caused by an increase in government spending, 
we will now examine how changes in income inequality affect the welfare losses of poor 
workers and wealthy workers. We do so by differentiating equations (39) and (40), same as 
before:   
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    Equations (41) and (44) show that when the number of poor workers increases, social 
welfare losses become greater when poor workers are taxed, but decrease when wealthy 
workers pay the taxes. Increases in the MPC have an ambiguous effect on welfare losses in 
the economy as the outcome depends critically on the size of the MPC and the price level of 
the economy. 
    What is important for the evaluation of fiscal policy is to see if it can be Pareto improving. 
Following Adam (2004), we examine if the gains from increased government spending are 
greater than the cost of taxes necessary to finance them by comparing the net increase in 
expenditure and output caused by a tax-financed rise in government spending, with the 
welfare losses of the income group that pays the taxes: 
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    Equation (45) gives us the welfare effect that an increase in government spending has when 
poor workers finance this increase, while equation (46) gives us the same result when wealthy 
workers finance the increase in government spending. As we can see, increased government 
spending positively affects social welfare but this effect is diminished because the increase in 
taxes needed to finance this rise in government spending lowers income, consumption and 
utility for the people who pay the taxes. Fiscal policy in this model can be Pareto improving if 
the term inside the parentheses in equations (45) and (46), which is the net social welfare 
gains of the tax-paying segment of the population, is greater than or equal to zero1. If this is 
the case then the welfare of the tax paying segment of the population increases or remains 
unchanged, which means that the government’s fiscal policy leads to a Pareto improvement. 
We summarize the logic behind this result using the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: In an economy with income inequality and imperfect competition in the goods 
market, fiscal policy is Pareto improving if the income gains which taxpayers have when 
expenditure and output increases due to higher government spending are greater than or 
equal to the income losses they have because of the taxes they pay to fund government 
spending. 
                                               
1 An increase in government spending is always welfare improving for the income group that does not 
pay taxes; therefore terms outside the parentheses are always positive: 
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    As we have seen in Section 3, increased government spending financed by taxing wealthy 
workers is more productive, which leads to a greater rise of profits and consumption, resulting 
in the maximum net increase in expenditure and 
output    
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positive effects of increased government spending on social welfare are in fact greater when 
wealthy workers are taxed. However, as we have seen in this Section increased government 
spending also incurs a welfare cost, due to increased taxes. Therefore, in order to find which 
type of fiscal policy is optimal not just in achieving the maximum net increase in expenditure 
and output but also in achieving the maximum increase in social welfare we must compare 
equation (45) with equation (46). If 21 VVVV dWdW    then the optimal policy in terms of 
social welfare is an increase in government spending financed by taxing wealthy workers; if 
instead 21 VVVV dWdW    then the opposite is true.  By rearranging terms and simplifying, 
we find the necessary condition under which the maximum increase in social welfare occurs 
when increased government spending is financed through taxation of wealthy workers: 
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    Similarly, we also find the same condition for the case in when it is optimal in terms of 
welfare for poor workers to finance increased government spending: 
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    Ccomparing equations (47) and (48) we find that fiscal policy achieves the maximum 
increase in social welfare when taxing wealthy workers if the welfare losses due to higher 
taxes are smaller than the welfare losses when poor workers are taxed; or in other words if the 
gains in social welfare from higher government spending when taxing wealthy workers are 
greater than the welfare gains from higher government spending when poor workers are taxed 
(and vice versa):  
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    Our results are formally presented in the following Proposition: 
 
Proposition 5: In an economy with income inequality and imperfect competition in the goods 
market, fiscal policy leads to the maximum increase in social welfare when the welfare losses 
(net welfare gains) associated with increased taxation (government spending) are smaller 
(greater) than the welfare losses (net welfare gains) associated with all other possible 
spending – taxing schemes, which the government can use.  
 
5.   Numerical solution  
    In this section, we provide a quantitative assessment of the output and welfare results of 
fiscal policy under different key parameters, namely the Lerner index (  ), the number of 
poor workers ( ) and the MPCs of poor workers and wealthy workers ( 1 , 2 ). We use 
different MPCs taken from Carroll et al (2014; 2016), Japelli and Pistaferri, (2014) and 
Anderson et al (2016) in order to obtain better and more robust results. 
    There are four Tables presented below. Tables 1-2 give us the effect of an increase in 
firms’ market power under constant numbers of poor workers and wealthy workers. Tables 3-
4 give us the effect of an increase in the number of poor workers when firms’ market power 
remains the same. Column 2 gives us the government spending multiplier, Columns 3 and 4 
the tax multiplier when poor workers and wealthy workers are taxed and Columns 5 and 6 the 
balanced budget multiplier when poor workers and wealthy workers are taxed respectively.  
Columns 7 to 9 show us the effects of fiscal policy on the welfare of poor workers and 
wealthy workers and on social welfare when poor workers finance government spending and 
Columns 10 to 12 give us the same results when wealthy workers are taxed. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
    In Tables 1 and 2, we see that imperfect competition )(  positively affects the size of the 
government spending multiplier making it greater than unity, except for the case where 0  
and 1

G
Y . Similarly, imperfect competition has a negative, although quantitatively smaller, 
effect on tax multipliers making the balanced budget multiplier always positive. The impact 
of imperfect competition on the balanced budget multiplier remains the same when using 
different values of the MPCs; however, the effect of the MPC on the size of the multiplier is 
ambiguous because higher MPCs positively affect both government spending and tax 
multipliers. More specifically, when poor workers are taxed, and for 9.00   the 
maximum net increase in expenditure and output comes when  07.0,2.0 21    and only 
for 1  does the maximum net increase in expenditure and output come 
when 12.0,72.0 21   . When instead wealthy workers are taxed higher MPCs have a 
positive effect on the net increase in expenditure and output the only exception being 
when 1.00   . In addition, the balanced budget multiplier is always bigger when wealthy 
workers are taxed, being greater than unity in all cases except for 1.00   . These findings 
prove that greater imperfect competition makes higher government spending more 
productive, leading to a greater rise in profits, and consumption which results in a 
greater rise in output; additionally the maximum net increase in expenditure and 
output comes when increased government spending is financed by taxing wealthy 
workers.   
    The impact of imperfect competition on the net welfare gains of both income groups and on 
social welfare is also positive; however, the effect of the MPC on these variables depends on 
firms’ market power and the size of each income group, particularly when poor workers are 
taxed. In this case, the maximum net welfare gains of this income group vary greatly. More 
specifically, for 4.00   the maximum net welfare gains for poor workers come when 
 07.0,2.0 21   ; for higher values the effect is negative. For 9.05.0    the 
maximum net welfare gains for poor workers come when 05.0,45.0 21   . Only when 
1  do the maximum net welfare gains for poor workers come 
when 12.0,72.0 21   . Looking at the net welfare gains of wealthy workers we find 
that when 8.00    the effect of the MPC is actually negative, and that the maximum net 
welfare gains come when  04.0,06.0 21   ; when 9.0  and 1 , the maximum 
net gains in welfare come when  05.0,45.0 21    and  12.0,72.0 21    
respectively. Similarly, when 8.00    the maximum increase in social welfare comes 
when 07.0,2.0 21   ; when 9.0  the maximum net gains in welfare come when 
 05.0,45.0 21    and when 1  the maximum net gains in welfare come when 
 12.0,72.0 21   . In the case where wealthy workers are taxed the effect of the MPC 
on net welfare gains and on social welfare is positive, the only exception being the negative 
impact of the MPC on the net welfare gains of poor workers for 0  with the maximum 
net welfare gains coming when 04.0,06.0 21   . Maximum net welfare gains for 
wealthy workers and maximum values in social welfare come when  12.0,72.0 21    
meaning that for these variables the MPC has a positive impact. Furthermore, regardless of 
differences in imperfect competition and the MPC, when we compare Columns 9 and 12 we 
find that the maximum increase in social welfare always comes when the government taxes 
wealthy workers. 
    
[Table 3 here] 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
 Tables 3 and 4 give us the result of a change in the number of poor workers under constant 
imperfect competition. An increase in the number of poor workers has, as expected, a positive 
effect on government spending multiplier with the multiplier always being greater than unity. 
When it comes to tax multipliers, the result is negative when poor workers are taxed but 
positive when wealthy workers pay the taxes. Looking at the balanced budget multiplier we 
find a positive effect when wealthy workers pay taxes, with multipliers that are greater than 
unity and a negative effect when the government taxes poor workers.      
    We then evaluate the effect that the number of poor workers has on the net welfare gains of 
each worker type and to social welfare. When poor workers are taxed, we find that the net 
welfare gains of each income group as well as social welfare depend critically upon the 
combination of different MPCs and the number of poor workers. For 6.05.0    the 
maximum net gains for poor workers come when  05.0,45.0 21    while for higher 
values of   the maximum net gains for poor workers come when 07.0,2.0 21   . 
Looking at the case of wealthy workers the MPC seems to have a negative effect on this 
group’s welfare, as the maximum net gains in welfare come when 04.0,06.0 21   . 
When it comes to social welfare, the maximum gains come when 07.0,2.0 21   . 
When instead wealthy workers are taxed the MPC seems to have a positive effect on the net 
welfare gains of both income groups and on social welfare. Finally the maximum increase in 
social welfare always comes when wealthy workers are taxed and the MPC is 
 12.0,72.0 21   . 
    To sum up, our empirical results seem to verify the main findings of our model. Our results 
are also very similar to the findings of the relevant literature about the role of imperfect 
competition on fiscal policy effectiveness (Hart, (1982); Dixon, (1987); Mankiw, (1987); 
Bénassy, (2001; 2005); Dosi et al, (2010; 2013)) and the effect that changes in income 
inequality –either in the form of changes in the number of poor workers and wealthy workers 
or in the form of changes in the MPC- have on fiscal multipliers(Carroll et al, (2014; 2016), 
Japelli and Pistaferri, (2014); Anderson et al, (2016); Gornemann et al, (2015); Auclert, 
(2017);  Auclert and Ronglie, (2018)) and on the welfare effects of fiscal policy ((Thorat, 
(1998); Fiszbein and Schady, (2009);  Evans and Popova, (2014)).  
 
6. Conclusion 
    This paper investigates the effect of imperfect competition and income inequality on fiscal 
policy, output and welfare using a New Keynesian model of imperfect competition in the 
goods market (Hart, (1982); Dixon, (1987); Mankiw, (1987); Bénassy, (2001; 2005) with 
income inequality due to skill/wage differences (Auclert and Ronglie, (2018)). Our results 
prove that imperfect competition positively affects the government spending and balanced 
budget multipliers meaning that greater imperfect competition increases government spending 
productivity, leading to a greater increase in profits, consumption and output; similarly, 
imperfect competition negatively affects taxes (Hart, (1982); Dixon, (1987); Mankiw, (1987); 
Bénassy, (2001; 2005); Dosi et al, (2010; 2013)). Income inequality, also positively affects 
government spending multipliers, as the consumption of poor workers is greater than the 
consumption of wealthy workers implying that government spending is more productive when 
most of the population consists of poor workers. Similarly, inequality negatively affects tax 
multipliers. Furthermore, when examining the balanced budget multiplier we find that it is 
always positive regardless of which income group is taxed, and that income inequality has a 
negative impact on the net effect of fiscal policies when poor workers pay the taxes. When, 
instead, wealthy workers are taxed, then income inequality positively affects the net effect of 
fiscal policies; consequently, the maximum net increase in expenditure and output comes 
when governments finance higher government spending by taxing wealthy workers (Hazel 
and Thorat, (1998); Fiszbein and Schady, (2009); Evans and Popova, (2014)). Our findings 
are also similar to Carroll et al (2014; 2016), Japelli and Pistaferri (2014); Anderson et al 
(2016), as well as Gornemann et al (2015), Auclert (2017) and Auclert and Ronglie (2018).  
Looking at social welfare, we find that imperfect competition, positively affects the net 
welfare gains of both income groups and social welfare. In addition, greater numbers of poor 
workers reduce net welfare gains and social welfare when poor workers are taxed while the 
opposite is true when wealthy workers are taxed. Higher MPCs have an ambiguous effect on 
net welfare gains and social welfare when poor workers are taxed but a positive effect when 
wealthy workers are taxed. Therefore, our model proves that under imperfect competition and 
income inequality the maximum net increase in expenditure and output and the maximum 
increase in social welfare comes when the government increases government spending and 
taxes wealthy workers ((Thorat, (1998); Fiszbein and Schady, (2009);  Evans and Popova, 
(2014)). 
    This model could be extended in several directions. First, we can alter our model by 
allowing government spending to affect utility and output in the economy directly. In 
addition, a more complete analysis of the labor market and the idiosyncrasies leading to 
income inequality and different types of taxes such as labor or profit taxation can be 
examined. Finally, our model could become dynamic in order to study the effects of fiscal 
policy in the long run as well as incorporate savings and investment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Appendix 
Table 1: Effect of change in imperfect competition under different MPCs. 
Panel a:   72.01      12.02   6.0     4.01    
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
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
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
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
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2VGG
Y


 
1d 1VV   
2d 1VV   
21  dd  1VV   
1d 2VV   
2d 2VV   
21  dd  2VV   
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.000 
1.050 
1.106 
1.168 
1.238 
1.316 
1.404 
1.506 
1.623 
1.761 
1.923 
-0.432 
-0.454 
-0.478 
-0.505 
-0.535 
-0.568 
-0.607 
-0.651 
-0.701 
-0.761 
-0.831 
-0.048 
-0.050 
-0.053 
-0.056 
-0.059 
-0.063 
-0.067 
-0.072 
-0.078 
-0.085 
-0.092 
 
0.568 
0.597 
0.628 
0.664 
0.703 
0.747 
0.798 
0.855 
0.922 
1.000 
1.092 
0.952 
1.000 
1.053 
1.112 
1.178 
1.253 
1.337 
1.434 
1.545 
1.676 
1.831 
 
0.009 
0.026 
0.045 
0.067 
0.090 
0.117 
0.147 
0.182 
0.222 
0.268 
0.324 
0.227 
0.239 
0.251 
0.265 
0.281 
0.299 
0.319 
0.342 
0.369 
0.400 
0.437 
0.236 
0.265 
0.297 
0.332 
0.371 
0.416 
0.466 
0.524 
0.590 
0.668 
0.761 
0.571 
0.600 
0.632 
0.667 
0.707 
0.758 
0.802 
0.860 
0.927 
1.006 
1.098 
0.104 
0.123 
0.144 
0.168 
0.194 
0.224 
0.258 
0.296 
0.341 
0.393 
0.455 
0.675 
0.723 
0.776 
0.835 
0.901 
0.975 
1.060 
1.157 
1.268 
1.399 
1.544 
Panel b:   45.01      05.02     6.0      4.01    
  
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
  
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
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
  
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
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2d 1VV   
21  dd  1VV   
1d 2VV   
2d 2VV   
21  dd  2VV   
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.000 
1.030 
1.062 
1.095 
1.131 
1.170 
1.211 
1.255 
1.302 
1.353 
1.408 
-0.270 
-0.278 
-0.287 
-0.296 
-0.305 
-0.316 
-0.327 
-0.339 
-0.352 
-0.365 
-0.380 
-0.020 
-0.021 
-0.021 
-0.022 
-0.023 
-0.023 
-0.024 
-0.025 
-0.026 
-0.027 
-0.028 
 
0.730 
0.752 
0.775 
0.800 
0.826 
0.854 
0.884 
0.916 
0.951 
0.988 
1.028 
0.980 
1.009 
1.040 
1.073 
1.109 
1.146 
1.186 
1.230 
1.276 
1.326 
1.380 
0.136 
0.150 
0.163 
0.178 
0.194 
0.211 
0.229 
0.248 
0.269 
0.291 
0.315 
 
0.292 
0.301 
0.310 
0.320 
0.330 
0.342 
0.354 
0.366 
0.380 
0.395 
0.411 
0.428 
0.450 
0.473 
0.498 
0.524 
0.552 
0.582 
0.614 
0.649 
0.686 
0.727 
 
0.588 
0.606 
0.624 
0.644 
0.665 
0.688 
0.712 
0.738 
0.766 
0.796 
0.828 
0.064 
0.076 
0.088 
0.101 
0.115 
0.131 
0.147 
0.164 
0.182 
0.202 
0.224 
0.652 
0.681 
0.712 
0.745 
0.781 
0.818 
0.858 
0.902 
0.948 
0.998 
1.052 
 
Table 2: Effect of change in imperfect competition under different MPCs. 
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21  dd  1VV   
1d 2VV   
2d 2VV   
21  dd  2VV   
Panel a:   20.01      07.02    6.0     4.01    
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.000 
1.015 
1.031 
1.046 
1.063 
1.080 
1.097 
1.116 
1.134 
1.154 
1.174 
-0.120 
-0.122 
-0.124 
-0.126 
-0.128 
-0.130 
-0.132 
-0.134 
-0.136 
-0.138 
-0.141 
-0.028 
-0.028 
-0.029 
-0.029 
-0.030 
-0.030 
-0.031 
-0.031 
-0.032 
-0.032 
-0.033 
 
0.880 
0.893 
0.907 
0.921 
0.935 
0.950 
0.966 
0.982 
0.998 
1.015 
1.033 
0.972 
0.987 
1.002 
1.017 
1.033 
1.050 
1.067 
1.084 
1.103 
1.121 
1.141 
0.164 
0.172 
0.180 
0.189 
0.197 
0.206 
0.216 
0.225 
0.235 
0.245 
0.256 
0.352 
0.357 
0.363 
0.368 
0.374 
0.380 
0.386 
0.393 
0.399 
0.406 
0.413 
0.516 
0.529 
0.543 
0.557 
0.572 
0.587 
0.602 
0.618 
0.634 
0.651 
0.669 
0.583 
0.592 
0.601 
0.610 
0.620 
0.630 
0.640 
0.651 
0.662 
0.673 
0.685 
0.078 
0.084 
0.090 
0.096 
0.103 
0.109 
0.116 
0.123 
0.131 
0.138 
0.146 
0.662 
0.676 
0.691 
0.707 
0.723 
0.739 
0.756 
0.774 
0.792 
0.811 
0.830 
Panel b:  06.01      04.02     6.0     4.01    
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.000 
1.005 
1.011 
1.016 
1.021 
1.027 
1.032 
1.038 
1.043 
1.049 
1.055 
-0.036 
-0.036 
-0.036 
-0.037 
-0.037 
-0.037 
-0.037 
-0.037 
-0.038 
-0.038 
-0.038 
-0.016 
-0.016 
-0.016 
-0.016 
-0.016 
-0.016 
-0.017 
-0.017 
-0.017 
-0.017 
-0.017 
 
0.964 
0.969 
0.974 
0.979 
0.984 
0.990 
0.995 
1.000 
1.006 
1.011 
1.017 
0.984 
0.989 
0.994 
1.000 
1.005 
1.010 
1.016 
1.021 
1.027 
1.032 
1.038 
0.100 
0.103 
0.106 
0.109 
0.113 
0.116 
0.119 
0.122 
0.125 
0.129 
0.132 
0.386 
0.388 
0.390 
0.392 
0.394 
0.396 
0.398 
0.400 
0.402 
0.405 
0.407 
0.486 
0.491 
0.496 
0.501 
0.507 
0.512 
0.517 
0.522 
0.527 
0.534 
0.540 
0.590 
0.593 
0.597 
0.600 
0.603 
0.606 
0.609 
0.613 
0.616 
0.619 
0.623 
0.055 
0.057 
0.060 
0.062 
0.064 
0.066 
0.068 
0.070 
0.073 
0.075 
0.077 
0.645 
0.650 
0.657 
0.662 
0.667 
0.672 
0.677 
0.683 
0.689 
0.694 
0.700 
 
 
 
Table 3: Effect of change in the number of poor workers under different MPCs 
Panel a:   72.01      12.02     5.0  
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1d 2VV   
2d 2VV   
21  dd  2VV   
0.5 
0.55 
0.6 
0.65 
0.7 
0.75 
0.8 
0.85 
0.9 
0.95 
1 
1.266 
1.290 
1.316 
1.342 
1.370 
1.399 
1.429 
1.460 
1.493 
1.527 
1.563 
-0.456 
-0.511 
-0.568 
-0.628 
-0.690 
-0.755 
-0.823 
-0.893 
-0.967 
-1.044 
-1.125 
-0.076 
-0.070 
-0.063 
-0.056 
-0.049 
-0.042 
-0.034 
-0.026 
-0.018 
-0.009 
0.000 
 
0.810 
0.779 
0.747 
0.714 
0.679 
0.643 
0.606 
0.566 
0.525 
0.482 
0.438 
1.190 
1.221 
1.253 
1.286 
1.321 
1.357 
1.394 
1.434 
1.475 
1.518 
1.563 
0.129 
0.125 
0.117 
0.105 
0.089 
0.068 
0.042 
0.012 
-0.025 
-0.067 
-0.115 
0.405 
0.351 
0.299 
0.250 
0.204 
0.161 
0.121 
0.085 
0.053 
0.024 
0.000 
0.534 
0.475 
0.416 
0.355 
0.293 
0.229 
0.164 
0.097 
0.028 
-0.043 
-0.115 
 
0.595 
0.671 
0.752 
0.836 
0.924 
1.017 
1.115 
1.219 
1.327 
1.442 
1.563 
0.249 
0.238 
0.224 
0.208 
0.188 
0.166 
0.140 
0.111 
0.078 
0.041 
0.000 
0.843 
0.909 
0.975 
1.043 
1.113 
1.183 
1.256 
1.330 
1.405 
1.483 
1.563 
 
 
45.01      05.02      5.0  
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2d 2VV   
21  dd  2VV   
0.5 
0.55 
0.6 
0.65 
0.7 
0.75 
0.8 
0.85 
0.9 
0.95 
1 
1.143 
1.156 
1.170 
1.183 
1.198 
1.212 
1.227 
1.242 
1.258 
1.274 
1.290 
-0.257 
-0.286 
-0.316 
-0.346 
-0.377 
-0.409 
-0.442 
-0.475 
-0.509 
-0.545 
-0.581 
-0.029 
-0.026 
-0.023 
-0.021 
-0.018 
-0.015 
-0.012 
-0.009 
-0.006 
-0.003 
0.000 
 
0.886 
0.870 
0.854 
0.837 
0.820 
0.803 
0.785 
0.767 
0.748 
0.729 
0.710 
1.114 
1.130 
1.146 
1.163 
1.180 
1.197 
1.215 
1.233 
1.252 
1.271 
1.290 
0.192 
0.202 
0.211 
0.218 
0.222 
0.225 
0.226 
0.225 
0.221 
0.215 
0.207 
0.443 
0.391 
0.342 
0.293 
0.246 
0.201 
0.157 
0.115 
0.075 
0.036 
0.000 
0.634 
0.594 
0.552 
0.511 
0.469 
0.426 
0.383 
0.340 
0.296 
0.252 
0.207 
 
0.557 
0.622 
0.688 
0.756 
0.826 
0.898 
0.972 
1.048 
1.126 
1.207 
1.290 
 
0.147 
0.140 
0.131 
0.120 
0.108 
0.094 
0.079 
0.062 
0.043 
0.023 
0.000 
0.704 
0.761 
0.818 
0.876 
0.934 
0.992 
1.051 
1.110 
1.170 
1.230 
1.290 
 
 
Table 4: Effect of change in the number of poor workers under different MPCs 
Panel a:   20.01      07.02     5.0  
  
G
Y

  
1V
Y

  
2V
Y

  
1VGG
Y


 
2VGG
Y


 
1d 1VV 
 
2d 1VV 
 
21  dd  1VV   
1d 2VV   
2d 2VV   
21  dd  2VV   
0.5 
0.55 
0.6 
0.65 
0.7 
0.75 
0.8 
0.85 
0.9 
0.95 
1 
1.072 
1.076 
1.080 
1.084 
1.088 
1.091 
1.095 
1.099 
1.103 
1.107 
1.111 
-0.107 
-0.118 
-0.130 
-0.141 
-0.152 
-0.164 
-0.175 
-0.187 
-0.199 
-0.210 
-0.222 
-0.038 
-0.034 
-0.030 
-0.027 
-0.023 
-0.019 
-0.015 
-0.012 
-0.008 
-0.004 
0.000 
 
0.965 
0.958 
0.950 
0.943 
0.935 
0.928 
0.920 
0.912 
0.905 
0.897 
0.889 
1.035 
1.042 
1.050 
1.057 
1.065 
1.072 
1.080 
1.088 
1.095 
1.103 
1.111 
0.179 
0.193 
0.206 
0.219 
0.230 
0.241 
0.251 
0.260 
0.268 
0.276 
0.283 
0.483 
0.431 
0.380 
0.330 
0.281 
0.232 
0.184 
0.137 
0.090 
0.045 
0.000 
0.662 
0.624 
0.587 
0.549 
0.511 
0.473 
0.435 
0.397 
0.359 
0.321 
0.283 
 
0.517 
0.573 
0.630 
0.687 
0.745 
0.804 
0.864 
0.925 
0.986 
1.048 
1.111 
0.129 
0.120 
0.109 
0.098 
0.087 
0.074 
0.061 
0.047 
0.032 
0.016 
0.000 
0.647 
0.693 
0.739 
0.786 
0.832 
0.878 
0.925 
0.971 
1.018 
1.064 
1.111 
Panel b:   06.01      04.02      5.0  
  
G
Y

  
1V
Y

  
2V
Y

  
1VGG
Y


 
2VGG
Y


 
1d 1VV 
 
2d 1VV 
 
21  dd  1VV   
1d 2VV   
2d 2VV   
21  dd  2VV   
0.5 
0.55 
0.6 
0.65 
0.7 
0.75 
0.8 
0.85 
0.9 
0.95 
1 
1.026 
1.026 
1.027 
1.027 
1.028 
1.028 
1.029 
1.029 
1.030 
1.030 
1.031 
-0.031 
-0.034 
-0.037 
-0.040 
-0.043 
-0.046 
-0.049 
-0.052 
-0.056 
-0.059 
-0.062 
-0.021 
-0.018 
-0.016 
-0.014 
-0.012 
-0.010 
-0.008 
-0.006 
-0.004 
-0.002 
0.000 
 
0.995 
0.992 
0.990 
0.987 
0.985 
0.982 
0.979 
0.977 
0.974 
0.972 
0.969 
1.005 
1.008 
1.010 
1.013 
1.015 
1.018 
1.021 
1.023 
1.026 
1.028 
1.031 
0.099 
0.107 
0.116 
0.124 
0.131 
0.139 
0.146 
0.153 
0.160 
0.166 
0.172 
0.497 
0.447 
0.396 
0.346 
0.295 
0.246 
0.196 
0.147 
0.097 
0.049 
0.000 
0.596 
0.554 
0.512 
0.469 
0.427 
0.384 
0.342 
0.299 
0.257 
0.215 
0.172 
0.503 
0.554 
0.606 
0.658 
0.711 
0.763 
0.816 
0.870 
0.923 
0.977 
1.031 
0.080 
0.073 
0.066 
0.059 
0.051 
0.043 
0.035 
0.027 
0.018 
0.009 
0.000 
 
0.583 
0.627 
0.673 
0.717 
0.762 
0.807 
0.851 
0.896 
0.941 
0.986 
1.031 
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